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they be meaningful. Indeed, it would violate Furmanto say that once in
the category of people for whom the death penalty is possible, the jury
could be given arbitrary factors to use in choosing whom to actually
impose that penalty upon. Thus, where a state chooses to impose an
additional narrowing, as Virginia does in requiring an aggravating factor
to be found, that narrowing must also be meaningfully guided. That
guidance can only come from an adequate definition.
This constitutional requirement recently was reiterated by the
United States Supreme Court in Tuilaepav. California.16 In Tuilaepa,
the Court addressed the question of whether certain statutory factors
16 114 S. Ct. 2630 (1994).
17
Id. at 2626.
18
1d. (quotingJurekv. Texas, 428 U.S. 262,279 (1976) (White, J.,
concurring in judgment)).

given to the sentencer to consider after a defendant was found'deatheligible were unconstitutionally vague. 17 In order to avoid being vague
and therefore unconstitutional, the Court concluded that the factor must
have some "'common-sense core of meaning... that criminal juries
' 18
should be capable of understanding.'
Although the Court upheld the statutory factors at issue in Tuilaepa,
it still did so only after subjecting them to vagueness analysis. In Tuggle,
the Fourth Circuit was faced with an incomplete version of a vileness
instruction that, even in its complete form, has serious vagueness
problems. To the extent the Fourth Circuit was arguing that a non-vague
definition ofvileness was not required because the defendant had already
been convicted of capital murder, its argument would violate the teachings of Tuilaepa andFurman.
Summary and analysis by:
Mary E. Eade

BARNES v. THOMPSON
58 F.3d 971 (4th Cir. 1995)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
Using an employee of Bon's Supermarket as a shield, Herman
Barnes and accomplice James Corey forced their way into the Hampton
store on June 27, 1985.1 Owner Clyde Jenkins, age seventy-three,
struggledwithBames. Barnes shothim twice. StoreemployeeMohanmed
Afifi, running from the back of the store,jumped on Barnes. Barnes shot
and killed Afifi after shaking him off his back. Jenkins then tried to get
up but Barnes shot him again. When police arrived, they found an unfired
gun under or near Jenkins' body. Jenkins died in the hospital two weeks
2
later.
Jenkins' gun was admitted into evidence at Barnes' trial, but no
witness gave any testimony as to exactly where it was found. The
Circuit Court for the City of Hampton convicted Barnes of capital
murder and subsequently sentenced him to death based on the
"vileness" aggravating factor. 3 The Supreme Court of Virginia
affirmed the conviction and death sentence 4 and the United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari. 5 Barnes filed a petition with the
Commonwealth for writ of habeas corpus. The Circuit Court for the
City of Hampton dismissed the petition and the Supreme Court of
Virginia denied Barnes' petition for appeal. 6 The United States
7
Supreme Court denied certiorari.
Barnes next filed a habeas petition in federal court, raising the same
issues he had in state court. He also raised a new claim, charging that the
Commonwealth had violated his right to due process under Brady v.
Maryland8 andUnitedStates v.Bagley 9 by failing to disclose the specific
location of Jenkins' gun. 10 Barnes moved to dismiss his first petition and
filed a new one in state court, raising the Brady claim. 11 The state court
I Barnes v. Thompson, 58 F.3d 971, 973 (4th Cir. 1995).
21Id.
3Id.
4
Barnes v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 130, 360 S.E.2d 196 (1987).
5 Barnes v. Virginia, 484 U.S. 1036 (1988).
6Barnes v. Thompson, 58 F.3d at 973.
7
Barnes v. Thompson, 497 U.S. 1011 (1990).
8 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
9 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
10 Barnes v. Thompson, 58 F.3d at 973.
11 UnderRosev. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982), Barnes had to exhaust

dismissed it on the ground that, pursuant to Virginia Code section 8.01654(B)(2), writs are not to be granted based on facts the petitioner knew
12
about and could have included in previous petitions.
Barnes filed his second federal habeas petition in 1992. The
district court dismissed seven of his ten assignments of error, but
ordered an evidentiary hearing on the other three: the Brady claim;
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim; and a claim that the death
13
penalty had been improperly imposed if the victim had been armed.
The court granted Barnes relief on the Brady claim, finding that
although the suppression of the evidence concerning the victim's
gun was not sufficient to undermine confidence in Barnes' capital
murder conviction, it was sufficient to undermine confidence in the
death sentence. The district court vacated the sentence accordingly,
finding specifically that if Barnes had had evidence of the gun's
location at trial, the trial court might not have found he had commit14
ted an aggravated battery and might not have found "vileness."
The district court denied Barnes relief on his ineffective assistance
of counsel claim. The Commonwealth appealed, contending that the
district court had erred in failing to find that Barnes had procedurally
defaulted the Brady claim under Virginia Code section 8.01654(B)(2). 15 Barnes cross-appealed the denial of his ineffective
16
assistance of counsel claim.
HOLDING
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed
the judgment of the district court as to the Brady claim, finding that
Barnes had procedurally defaulted it, and had failed to show cause for the
all his state remedies before proceeding to federal court. Since he had not
raised the Brady claim previously at the state level, he had to do so before
bringing his entire case to federal court. The Brady claim is referred to
as a "Bagley claim" by the Court of Appeals throughout its opinion.
Barnes,58 F.3d at 974.
12
Id.at 973.
13
Id.
14
Id.at 973-74.
15 Id.at 974.
16
Id.at 979.
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default. 17 The court also affirmed the district court's denial of relief on
th6 ineffective assistance of counsel claim and ordered reinstatement of
the death sentence. 18
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
The Fourth Circuit's opinion informatively demonstrates inconsistent treatment of the same issue arising in three distinct contexts.
Procedural default, prosecutorial failure to turn over exculpatory evidence (i.e., Brady violations), and ineffective assistance of counsel all
involve questions of "cause" (including the reasonableness of a defense
attorney's conduct) and "prejudice" as to the potential impact of an error
on the outcome of a proceeding. In evaluating the trial attorney's conduct
in light of these three issues, the Fourth Circuit inconsistently characterized the attorney's actions as "unreasonable" under its analysis of
procedural default and the Brady claim, but "reasonable" under its
analysis of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
I.

Procedural Default
A. The "Default" Itself

Under Wainwright v. Sykes, 19 if a habeas petitioner procedurally
defaults a claim to a state court, and ifthe state court denies relief because
the default constituted an adequate and independent state ground for that
denial, a federal habeas court will not hear the claim unless the petitioner
can show both cause and prejudice for the default. 20 Sykes, in essence,
defmed "cause" as a reasonable excuse for failure to present the claim in
an earlier petition, and "prejudice" as the effect of the error on which a
21
petitioner based his claim.
Before proceeding to the cause and prejudice analysis, however, it
must first be established that petitioner truly defaulted the issue. The
district court decided that Barnes had defaulted his Brady claim, but
granted him relief from the default.22 The court held that Barnes had
demonstrated cause by showing that the Brady violation had prevented
him from knowing about the potential claim when preparing his first
petition, which constituted a reasonable excuse for not including the
claim in that petition. 23 The district court also found that Barnes had
demonstrated prejudice by showing the Brady violation's potential
effect on the trial court's application of the "vileness" aggravating factor.
Barnes had argued that the prosecution's withholding of the gun's
location prevented Barnes from using that information to rebut the
Commonwealth's contention that the alleged aggravated battery proved

17

Id. at 974.
18 Id. at 979.
19433 U.S. 72 (1977).
20
Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87.
21 Id.
22
Barnes,58 F.3d at 972.
23
Id. at 973-74.
24
1d. at 974. As the Fourth Circuit observed, Barnes did not testify
that he saw the gun. The Fourth Circuit seemed satisfied to assume from
this fact that Barnes did not see the gun. No court discussed the difficulty
in simply assuming from the absence of testimony that Barnes did not see
it, since he had no obligation and could not be compelled to testify at trial.
U.S. Const. Amend. V.
25 Id. at 974.
26
Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-654(B)(2) (Supp. 1994) (emphasis added).
27
See, e.g., Stockton v. Murray, 41 F.3d 920 (4th Cir. 1994), and
case summary of Stockton, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No. 2, p. 10
(1995).

"vileness." In other words, had the prosecution disclosed the location of
the gun, Barnes could have shown that the shooting of Jenkins was not
vile.2 4
However, the district court could have, and as Circuit Judge
Murnaghan's concurrence in Barnesillustrates, should have, found that
Barnes did not default his claim at all. Virginia Code section 8.01654(B)(2) 25 , the statute relied upon by the Supreme Court of Virginia to
default Barnes' claim, states that "[n]o writ shall be granted on the basis
ofany allegation the facts ofwhich petitioner had knowledge at the time
of filing any previous petition." 26 The statute does not provide that any
allegation the facts of which petitioner should have known will prevent
a writ from issuing. Thus, the only relevant inquiry should have been
whether Barnes actually knew about the gun's location at the time ofthe
first petition. In the district court, whether or not Barnes urged that there
was no default was irrelevant. As a practical matter, the result was the
same. The district court heard the Brady claim on the merits.
The Fourth Circuit, however, decided that Barnes had indeed
defaulted his claim under Virginia Code section 654(B)(2). As it has
done in other cases, the Fourth Circuit read the "should have known"
requirement into the statute. 27 One would expect the legislature to be
explicit when it intends to bar claims on the basis that a defendant "should
have known" a given fact. The legislature did not do so here.
Judge Murnaghan, concurring in the court's judgment, made several important observations. First, he noted that "Barnes did not discover
the location of the gun, and the nondisclosure, until after his first habeas
petition had been denied." 28 He understood that Barnes did not know
about the gun's location and thus could not have defaulted the issue. As
to the majority's opinion that Barnes "should have known" about the
gun's location, Judge Murnaghan stated that "[w]hether one uses Black's
or Webster's, the words 'had knowledge' do not mean 'either knew or
had available."' 29
The Barnesmajority further compounded its error by incorrectly
claiming that once the state had rejected Barnes' claim on procedural
grounds, federal courts could not look beyond that finding and had to
proceed to the cause and prejudice analysis. 30 The court ignored the
requirement that the state finding of default must be supported by
evidence. Judge Murnaghan challenged the majority's finding on this
point,3 1 noting that state procedural grounds for default are entitled to
deference only if the record contains evidence to support the default
under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(d)(8). 32 In other words, the record had to
contain evidence that Barnes knew about the gun for Barnes to have
defaulted his claim.

28

Barnes,58 F.3d at 985.
Id.at 984, note 5.
30
Barnes,58 F.3d at 974, note 2.
31 Barnes,58 F.3d at 986, note 9.
32 That statute states in relevant part:
(d) In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an
application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant
to the judgment of a State court, a determination after a hearing on the
merits of a factual issue, made by a State court of competent jurisdiction
in a proceeding to which the applicant for the writ and the State or an
officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a written finding,
written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be
presumed to be correct, unless the applicant shall establish or it shall
otherwise appear, or the respondent shall admit-...
(8)... that part of the record of the State court proceeding in
which the determination of such factual issue was made.., is not fairly
supported by the record...
29
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B. Cause for Default
Having concluded that Barnes actually defaulted his Brady issue,
the Fourth Circuit proceeded to the cause and prejudice analysis under
Sykes. Since it had read the "should have known" requirement into the
statute, the court consequently found that Barnes "should have known,"
i.e., should have been able to find out, the location of Jenkins' gun. The
court also found that "no external factor existed to excuse Barnes' failure
to present this claim," 33 and thus concluded that Barnes had failed to
show "cause" for the default under Sykes. 34 Since Judge Mumaghan
thought Barnes had not defaulted the issue, he stated that the majority
incorrectly analyzed Barnes' claim under the "cause" analysis of Sykes,
using the same arguments he had used to challenge the majority's finding
of default.
C. Prejudice from Default
The Fourth Circuit also found that the Brady violation occasioned
no prejudice to the application of the vileness factor. The court first noted
that Barnes never claimed he saw the gun. Then the court interpreted
Virginia law to read that the fact Jenkins was armed was irrelevant to the
finding that Barnes had committed an aggravated battery (upon which
the trial court based its determination of "vileness"). This finding is
certainly defensible, even under a constitutionally acceptable definition
of aggravated battery. The majority in Barnes,however, defined it even
more incorrectly than the Supreme Court of Virginia has in the past. The
court decided that the gravamen of aggravated battery "is the number of
wounds and the lapse of time between the first wound and the wound that
immediately causes the death." 35 By using this definition, the court
defeated the purpose of an aggravating factor such as "vileness."
Aggravating factors are meant to narrow the class of persons
available for the death penalty and guide sentencing discretion by
singling out those who are most culpable in the commission of their
offense. 36 Accordingly, in the past the Supreme Court of Virginia has
defined an aggravated battery as one that "qualitatively and quantitatively, is more culpable that the minimum necessary to accomplish an act
of murder."' 37 Arguably, the "qualitative" portion of the definition
accomplishes the narrowing and guiding functions by identifying which
batteries are more culpable than others. Yet the Fourth Circuit's definition does not include any "qualitative" instruction; it defines an aggravated battery based on the quantitative factors ofnumber of wounds and
38
amount of time between the first wound and the wound causing death.
The Fourth Circuit's definition does not serve any narrowing function.
33

Barnes,58 F.3d at 974.
Id. at 974-75.
35
Id.at 978.
36
Godfrey v. Georgia,446 U.S. 420 (1980); Zant v. Stephens, 462
U.S. 862 (1983).
37
Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455,478,248 S.E.2d 135, 149
(1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979).
38
The Fourth Circuit's definition actually reads out the "qualitative" portion from the definition of aggravated battery which it supposedly follows. The court quoted from Boggs v. Bair,892 F.2d 1193, 1197
(4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,495 U.S. 940 (1990), which stated "that the
number or nature of the batteries inflicted upon the victim is a proper
test as to whether the defendant's conduct was outrageous or wantonly
vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved an aggravated battery."
Boggs, 892 F.2d at 1197 (emphasis added). The Boggs definition thus
included a qualitative element ("nature of the batteries"), while the
Fourth Circuit's definition in Barnes did not.
39
Barnes,58 F.3d at 986-87.
40 See Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S. Ct. 1555 (1995), and case summary
of Kyles, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
34

Judge Mumaghan did not address the prejudice issue as to Barnes'
alleged default; however, he did address the prejudice issue as to the
Brady claim itself. It should be noted, however, that there is no analytical
difference between prejudice as to default and prejudice as to a Brady
claim. In other words, Judge Mumaghan's analysis of prejudice as to the
default would have been the same as his analysis as to the Brady claim,
39
had he actually discussed the former issue.
H. Brady/B agley Claim
In reality, there is nothing analogous to a "cause" requirement
in the law of exculpatory evidence disclosure as set forth by the
United States Supreme Court in Brady and Bagley. The prosecution
is required to disclose evidence that falls within the ambit of Brady
and its progeny, whether or not defense counsel could have found
the evidence or information otherwise. 40 The Fourth Circuit's majority added a new requirement to Brady, built on its own prior
erroneous decisions, but not United States Supreme Court precedent. The court read in a provision that there is no Brady violation
if defense counsel could have located the evidence or information
with reasonable diligence. 41 The Fourth Circuit said this is true even
when the prosecution told the defense in writing that it had no
exculpatory evidence. It should be noted that once Barnes was told
that the Commonwealth had no exculpatory evidence, Barnes'
attorney was no longer obligated to ask the Commonwealth for such
42
evidence.
There is what amounts to a "prejudice" requirement in Brady
and Bagley. That is, a defendant must show a reasonable probability
that but for the Brady violation, the outcome of the proceeding
would have been different.4 3 A reasonable probability is defined as
sufficient to undermine confidence in the proceeding's outcome. 44
It is an easier showing than required by the "more likely than not"
45
standard.
Unfortunately, though he disagreed with the majority's findings as to default and cause, Judge Murnaghan rejected Barnes'
claim on its merits under the "prejudice" analysis. 46 Though he
found that Barnes satisfied the first part of the Brady/Bagley test by
showing that the Commonwealth had failed to disclose the exculpatory evidence as to the gun's location, he also concluded that Barnes
had failed to show "materiality." The majority could thus have
legitimately concluded as Judge Murnaghan did, that though Barnes
had not defaulted his Brady claim, he failed to show the requisite
prejudice under Bagley.

41 The court correctly citedMcCleskeyv. Zant,499U.S.467 (1991),
as far as that case related to default. Specifically, that case held that if a
defendant actually defaulted a claim, the defendant could not show
"cause" for the default if the basis for the omitted claim was reasonably
available. However, the Fourth Circuit in Barnes then immediately
changed this rule about cause for default into an unsupported pronouncement about the scope of the Brady rule, and thus grafted a new requirement on to the law of Brady. Barnes,58 F.3d at 975, n. 3.
42
See infratext accompanying note 66.
43
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
44
Id.
45 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984). Bagley
expressly adopted Strickland's definition of prejudice. Bagley, 473 U.S.
at 682.
46
Barnes, 58 F.3d at 983. Judge Mumaghan referred to Barnes'
failure to establish "materiality." This is the language of Brady and
Bagley that is, in reality, a prejudice requirement. There is a Brady
violation when material evidence is improperly withheld. Evidence is
material when its absence undermines confidence in the outcome, as
explained in Bagley and Strickland.
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M. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Under Strickland v. Washington,4 7 the seminal ineffective assistance of counsel decision, habeas petitioners must demonstrate two
elements. The first, analogous to the "cause" criterion of procedural
default claims, is a requirement that petitioner show that his attorney's
assistance was not reasonable under prevailing professional norms
(often called the "performance" prong). 48 The second requirement is that
petitioner must show that the attorney's failure prejudiced him (the
"prejudice" prong).49 This standard is identical to the Bagley standard
50
for prejudice from Brady violations.

weight to evidence if desiring to consider it as evidence of mitigation, even if it might also be seen as evidence of aggravation. 55 In
other words, Barnes' attorney's fear that potential mitigation evidence could be used against Barnes was overstated. Judge Murnaghan
stated in his concurrence that he would have found "prejudicial the
failure to raise evidence of Barnes' mental defects and his past
responsiveness to a juvenile rehabilitation program." '5 6 He noted
that such evidence could only have helped Barnes, not hurt him,
since it was not the kind of evidence that would indicate future
57
dangerousness.
B. Location of Store Owner's Gun

A. Mitigating Evidence
Barnes' ineffective assistance ofcounsel claim involved allegations
beyond and unconnected to his trial attorney's failure to find out about
the location of Jenkins' gun. The attorney also failed to investigate
certain potential mitigating evidence, specifically Barnes' family background and mental history. At the habeas proceeding, Barnes' trial
attorney testified that he did not investigate Barnes' family background
and mental history, first because Barnes had told him there was nothing
to investigate, and second, because he feared that the investigation would
uncover information which could be used against Barnes to find the
"future dangerousness" aggravating factor.51
'52
The Fourth Circuit characterized this as a "tactical decision."
Neither of the attorney's explanations should have been accepted,
however. Attorneys should always investigate the possibility of mitigating evidence in family background and mental history, whatever the
client's wishes; this is one of the most basic and important parts of a
defense attorney's job.53 This is especially important when the client is
impaired.
More importantly, Barnes' trial was a bench trial. Trial judges must
be presumed to know not to treat mitigation evidence as aggravation
evidence. In Penry v. Lynaugh,54 the United States Supreme Court held
that states must have a vehicle by which juries can give independent

Barnes' attorney also failed to investigate the location of
Jenkins' gun, as the Fourth Circuit itself stated when analyzing
Barnes' Brady/Bagley claims. Yet the majority simply affirmed the
district court's denial of Barnes' ineffective assistance of counsel
claims, without discussing at all Barnes' claim that his trial attorney's
failure to investigate the location of the gun constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel. The only reference the majority made to the
gun evidence was to characterize the attorney's failure to investigate it as a "tactical decision" during its discussion of the Brady
58
issue.
As Judge Murnaghan noted in his concurrence, the majority
thus effectively held that although the attorney's failure to investigate the gun evidence was unreasonable under Brady and Bagley, it
was reasonable under Strickland.59 In other words, the majority
gave three contradictory holdings concerning defense efforts to
learn about the gun evidence withheld by the prosecution. As to the
default, the majority held that defense counsel was unreasonable in
that he should have known about the failure to disclose at the time
of the first habeas petition. As to the merits of the Brady claim, the
majority decided that defense counsel was unreasonable because he
did not find the evidence which "reasonably diligent" investigation
would have revealed. Finally, as to the ineffective assistance of

47 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
48
Id.at 688.
49
Id. at 692.
50
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. In fact, Bagley expressly adopted for
Brady violations the same test for prejudice used in Strickland. Id.
51 Barnes,58 F.3d at 980.
52
1d. The Fourth Circuit also stated that"Barnes... is the paradigm
of 'a defendant [who] has given counsel reason to believe that pursuing
certain investigations would be fruitless or even harmful."' Id. (citing
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691).
53 The Fourth Circuit relied on Strickland to find the actions of
Bames' trial attorney reasonable. "If counsel does not conduct a substantial investigation into each of several plausible lines of defense, assistance may nonetheless be effective... 'when counsel's assumptions are
reasonable given the totality of the circumstances and when counsel's
strategy represents a reasonable choice based upon those assumptions,
counsel need not investigate lines of defense that he has chosen not to
employ at trial."' Strickland, 466 U.S. at 681 (quoting Strickland v.
Washington, 693 F.2d 1243, 1255 (5th Cir. 1982). Despite this pronouncement, the defense attorney should investigate a client's mental
history for two very important reasons. First, the attorney must inquire
into that history since the attorney cannot know if the client is impaired
until he or she investigates. Second, an attorney is presented with an
ethical problem when a client tells an attorney not to investigate the
client's mental history. See Henderson, PresentingMitigation Against

the Client's Wishes: A Moral or ProfessionalImperative?, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 6, No. 1,p. 32 (1993). Though Barnes did not forbid
his trial attorney from investigating his mental history, he did mislead the
attorney by stating that there was nothing to investigate. But if an attorney
has an ethical duty to investigate even when a client forbids it, then that
duty would certainly extend to cases where a client misleads an attorney
by saying that there is nothing to find. This is especially true since an
attorney cannot know if a client is capable of making such decisions
without investigating.
54492 U.S. 302 (1989).
55 The Court in Penry also noted that though mental retardation
might indicate future dangerousness, juries still must be allowed to spare
defendants based on mental retardation, if they so choose. See case
summary of Penry, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 2 (1989).
56
Barnes, 58 F.3d at 987.
57
1d. at 987-8 8.
58 Id. at 977. The majority's failure to discuss this issue is very
strange. Barnes clearly raised the claim in the district court, since the
majority briefly mentions the fact that the district court rejected the
claim. Id.
59
Id.at 987. Judge Murnaghan additionally noted that the attorney
could not possibly have made a "tactical decision" not to investigate
since the Commonwealth's assertion that it had no Brady material was
the reason the attorney was not required to investigate the evidence
concerning Jenkins' gun.
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counsel claim, the majority held that defense counsel's decision not
60
to investigate the gun evidence was tactically reasonable.
IV. Application in Virginia
The Fourth Circuit chose to deny Barnes relief on questionable
grounds; it could have rejected his claims for more plausible reasons.
Having acted as it did, the court left several lessons for Virginia
attorneys. First, counsel are urged not to concede prematurely that a
defendant has defaulted a given issue, especially where Virginia Code
section 8.01-654 is concerned. Counsel should raise objections to findings of procedural default which have no evidentiary basis and preserve
their denial as error. Such findings do not constitute defaults and thus are
not entitled to deference by federal courts. 6 1 Counsel should not concede
this issue once it arrives in the federal courts by arguing that defendant
62
had cause and prejudice for the default under Wainwright v. Sykes.
Second, counsel are advised to monitor closely what courts use to
define "aggravated battery," "vileness," and aggravating factors in
general. Attorneys should strenuously attempt to confine what trial
courts use to define these terms to those factors showing increased
culpability on the part of a defendant. Attorneys should object, for
instance, when the court tries to define aggravated battery without
including a qualitative element (how the battery was committed) as well
as a quantitative one (the number of wounds).
Third, especially at the trial level, and especially after the United
States Supreme Court's holding in Kyles v. Whitley,63 attorneys should
strenuously attempt to ensure that trial judges understand the magnitude
of the Fourth Circuit's error as to its doctrine thatBradyviolations have
not occurred where the defense could have discovered evidence or
information by reasonably diligent investigation. Attorneys must persuade trial judges that this is simply not the law. Judge Mumaghan's

criticisms are useful for this task. 64 The real law is that when the defense
asks the prosecution whether the prosecution has any exculpatory
evidence, the prosecution must turn over such evidence, even if reasonable defense counsel could find the evidence by other means. The
majority opinion incorrectly holds just the opposite, despite the fact that
such evidence is not "reasonably available" if the prosecution informs
the defense that there is no such evidence, as occurred in Barnes' case. 65
Under the majority's erroneous view, when the prosecution tells the
defense that it does not have any exculpatory evidence, defense counsel
should understand that this effectively means the prosecution has no
exculpatory evidence that the defense could not find by some other
66
means.
When making Brady requests, then, counsel are advised to make
requests as specific as possible. 67 For example, when trying to find out
ifpolice investigated other suspects, counsel should not only ask whether
there were any other suspects, but also ask exactly what the police did in
pursuit of this other investigation. If the police performed such an
investigation poorly, persons who otherwise would have been genuine
suspects may have been overlooked. This fact may serve to exculpate a
68
client. Such evidence is Brady material.
Finally, attorneys can make legitimate tactical decisions about
which evidence to present in mitigation at the penalty trial. Even
Strickland,however, subjects decisions not to investigate such potential
evidence to a reasonableness inquiry. Though Stricklanddid place too
much weight on the reliability of the client as a source of information for
the attorney, even Stricklanddid not involve an impaired client. Defense
counsel cannot know whether a client is impaired without investigating
the client's mental history. As such, the safest and most ethical course of
action for defense attorneys is to conduct a thorough investigation as to
potential mitigation evidence. 69 Only then may counsel make informed
decisions about whether actually to present that evidence at trial.
Summary and analysis by:
Gregory J. Weinig

60 Interestingly, Judge Mumaghan would have rejected most of
Barnes' claims under Strickland's "performance" analysis and stated
that it was unnecessary for him to address the "prejudice" requirement of
Strickland. He did it address it anyway, specifically finding that the
attorney's failure "to raise evidence of past abuse was not prejudicial,"
Barnes,58 F.3d at 987; but that the failure "to raise evidence of Barnes'
mental defects and his past responsiveness to a juvenile rehabilitation
program" was prejudicial. Id. This is the opposite of the usual way in
which courts analyze ineffective assistance of counsel claims; in fact,
Stricklanditself states that"Ei]f itis easier to dispose ofan ineffectiveness
claim on the ground of lack of sufficientprejudice, which we suspectwill
often be so, that course should be followed." Strickland,466 U.S. at 697.
Given the clarity of his analysis of other issues compared with that of the
majority, it is puzzling that Judge Mumaghan could find in effect that an
attorney could render reasonably effective assistance while at the same
time prejudicing his client to the extent of undermining confidence in the
outcome.
61 Recall that a federal court will not defer to a state court's
judgment of default if"such factual determination is not fairly supported
by the record." See infra note 32.

62433 U.S. 72 (1977).
63
115 S. Ct. 1555 (1995). See alsocase summary of Kyles, Capital
Defense Digest, this issue.
64
Barnes,58 F.3d at 984, note 5.
65 No United States Supreme Court cases are cited by the majority
in support of this proposition. For a United States Supreme Court case
contrary to the majority's pronouncement, see Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S.
Ct. 1555 (1995), and case summary of Kyles, Capital Defense Digest, this
issue.
66
See Barnes, 58 F.3d 975 at note 3, where the majority basically
instructs the prosecution how to accomplish this.
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